We study the social efficiency of several well-known mechanisms for the allocation of a set of available (advertising) positions to a set of competing budget-constrained users (advertisers). Specifically, we focus on the Generalized Second Price auction (GSP), the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism (VCG) and the Expressive Generalized First Price auction (EGFP). Using the liquid welfare as our efficiency benchmark, we prove a tight bound of 2 on the liquid price of anarchy and stability of these mechanisms for pure Nash equilibria.
of stability [1] of GSP is equal to 1. Caragiannis et al. [3] (see also [17] ) focused on worst-case equilibria and proved several bounds on the price of anarchy [13] of GSP with respect to a variety of equilibrium concepts, ranging from pure Nash and coarse-correlated equilibria in the full information setting to BayesNash equilibria in the incomplete information setting. Dütting et al. [10] proved bounds on the revenue and exploited more expressive input formats as a remedy for the non-existence of pure Nash equilibria in games induced by GFP. They designed the expressive generalized first price auction (EGFP) according to which each player submits a bid per position, the positions are auctioned off sequentially, and each player pays her bid for the position she is given.
All of the aforementioned papers studied the no-budget setting, where the players are assumed to be able to afford any payments, no matter how large these can get. However, in reality, the players have hard budget constraints that upper-bound the payments that they can afford. Following a series of recent papers that focus on such budget-constrained settings, we also study the social efficiency of position mechanisms by bounding the (pure) price of anarchy and stability in terms of the liquid welfare benchmark that takes budgets into account. Liquid welfare was first introduced by Dobzinski and Paes Leme [9] who focused on the design of truthful mechanisms for the allocation of multiple units of a single divisible item (see also [14, 15] for extensions of this setting). One of their very first results is the observation that the celebrated VCG mechanism [19, 7, 12] is no longer truthful, which is the case for VCG in our setting as well.
The liquid price of anarchy has been considered in a few related papers so far. Syrgkanis and Tardos [17] considered the liquid welfare benchmark under the term effective welfare and bounded the ratio between the optimal liquid welfare and the worst-case social welfare at equilibrium, in various strategic auction settings, including position mechanisms. Caragiannis and Voudouris [4] and Christodoulou et al. [6] were the first to provide constant bounds on the liquid price of anarchy (ratio of optimal liquid welfare over worst-case liquid welfare at equilibrium) of the proportional mechanism for the allocation of divisible resources. These results are based on the now-standard unilateral deviations technique (see also [16] ) and can be extended to more general equilibrium concepts, given a specific definition of the liquid welfare for randomized allocations.
Our upper bounds follow this technique as well, but it seems non-trivial to extend them to more general equilibrium concepts due to the particular form of the deviating bids used. For pure equilibria in particular, by exploiting the structure of worst-case equilibria, Caragiannis and Voudouris [5] were able to characterize the liquid price of anarchy of all mechanisms for the allocation of a single divisible resource, leading to tight bounds. Finally, Azar et al. [2] refined the definition of the liquid welfare for randomized allocations and proved constant liquid price of anarchy bounds over general equilibrium concepts for simultaneous first price auctions.
In Section 2, we formally describe the setting considered in this paper and the mechanisms that we are interested in. Then, in Section 3 we prove our main result: the liquid price of anarchy and stability of GSP, VCG and EGFP is exactly 2. Consequently, in contrast to the no-budget setting, when we consider players with budget constraints and the liquid welfare benchmark, these mechanisms do not have socially efficient equilibria. Such a phenomenon was first observed by Caragiannis and Voudouris [5] for all single divisible resource allocation mechanisms, and it might be the case that this holds for any position mechanism as well.
We conclude with a short discussion of possible extensions of our work in Section 4.
Preliminaries
There are n available positions such that position j has associated click-through-rate (CTR) 
and −∞ otherwise. We focus on three important greedy allocation mechanisms that function as follows.
Generalized Second Price (GSP)
Each player i submits a scalar b i ∈ R ≥0 . The players are sorted in non-increasing order in terms of these bids and are assigned to the corresponding positions. Each player i is charged the next highest bid per click, that is, the bid of player
, and her utility can be written as
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG)
Again, each player i submits a scalar b i ∈ R ≥0 , and the players are sorted in non-increasing order in terms of their bids. Each player i is charged the difference between the social welfare (based on the bids) of the players ranked below i if i did not participate and their actual social welfare when i participates. In other words, the payment of player i is
Expressive Generalized First Price (EGFP)
Each player i submits a vector b i ∈ R n ≥0 containing a bid per position. The positions are assigned to the players sequentially so that the next available position gets assigned to the player with the maximum bid for it, among the players that have not yet been allocated a position. In other words, let S j be the set of players that are competing for positions ℓ ≥ j; initially, S 1 contains all players. Then, π j (b, EGFP) = arg max i∈S j b i,j . Each player i is charged (in total) her bid for the position that she is allocated, i.e.,
, and her utility is
The game Liquid welfare, price of anarchy and price of stability
We measure the social efficiency of an assignment σ(b) by the liquid welfare benchmark, which is defined as the total value of the players, with the value of each player capped by her budget, i.e.,
The liquid price of anarchy (liquid price of stability) of a position game G(M ) that is induced by a position mechanism M is defined as the ratio between the optimal liquid welfare achieved by any assignment to the minimum (maximum) liquid welfare achieved at any equilibrium assignment. In other words, the liquid price of anarchy and the liquid price of stability of G(M ) are, respectively, equal to
.
Then, the liquid price of anarchy and stability of a mechanism M are respectively defined as the worst-case liquid price of anarchy and stability among all position games that are induced by M , i.e., LPoA
The no-over assumption: no-overbidding and no-overbudgeting
For the GSP and VCG mechanisms, in order to have meaningful bounds on the liquid price of anarchy,
This is a combination of the well-known no-overbidding assumption that demands that b i ≤ v i and a no-overbudgeting assumption that demands that 3 Bounds on the liquid price of anarchy and stability
We begin with Theorem 1, where we show that the LPoA and LPoS of GSP, VCG and EGFP are at least 2; notice that the example that we present in the following proof also proves that VCG is no longer truthful when the players have budget constraints. Then, in Theorem 2 we prove that this bound of 2 on the LPoA and LPoS is tight. Observe that, for the two possible assignments (1, 2) and (2, 1), the liquid welfare is LW(1, 2) = min{λ, 1+
ε} + min
and LW(2, 1) = min{1, 1 + ε} + min{1, 1} = 2. Therefore, since λ > 2 and ε < 1/2, we have that LW(2, 1) > LW(1, 2), and the optimal assignment is (2, 1). The ratio
tends to 2 as λ becomes arbitrarily large and ε becomes arbitrarily small. In order to prove the theorem, it suffices to show that there exists an equilibrium bid vector that induces the assignment (1, 2), while there exists no equilibrium bid vector that induces the assignment (2, 1).
GSP. First, consider the bid vector b = (1 + ε, 1) which induces the assignment (1, 2) . The utilities of the two players are u 1 (b, GSP) = λ − 1 and u 2 (b, GSP) = 1 λ . Player 2 has no incentive to deviate as, by the no-over assumption, she cannot bid above her budget (which coincides with her value), while any other bid would not change the assignment. Player 1 obviously has no incentive to deviate to any other bid b ′ 1 ≥ b 2 as the assignment as well as her payment would not change. So, consider the deviation of player 1 to the bid
Then, the induced assignment would be (2, 1) and player 1 would have utility
Therefore, b is an equilibrium, and the price of anarchy bound follows. 
λ > 1, respectively; the last inequality follows since (λ − 1) 2 > 0, for any λ > 2. Hence, since player 1 has incentive to deviate to b ′ 1 , b cannot be an equilibrium, and the price of stability bound follows.
EGFP. To show that there exists an equilibrium bid vector b that induces the assignment (1, 2), consider the bids b 1 = (1 + δ, 0), where δ > 0 is arbitrarily small, and b 2 = (1, 0) of the two players for the two available positions, respectively. Observe that after the allocation of the first position, the second one is given without any competition to the only remaining player. Therefore, at equilibrium, no player has any incentive to submit a bid that is greater than zero for the second position. Player 2 has no incentive to change her bid for the first position since she simply cannot bid any higher, while bidding any lower would not change the assignment. Player 1 has no incentive to deviate to any other bid b ′ 1,1 ≥ b 2,1 as the allocation and her payment would not change, and δ is assumed to be arbitrarily small. So, consider the deviating bid b ′ 1,1 < b 2,1 which would change the assignment to (2, 1) and the utility of player 1 would be
. Therefore, b is indeed an equilibrium, and the price of anarchy bound follows.
For the price of stability bound, assume that there exists an equilibrium bid matrix b such that b 1,1 ≤ b 2,1 ≤ 1 so that the allocation (2, 1) is induced; again the two players must bid zero for the second position which is, basically, for free. The utilities of the two players at this equilibrium are u 1 (b, EGFP) = 1 and
Consider the deviation of player 1 to the bid b ′ 1,1 = 1 + δ > b 2,1 for the first position, where δ > 0 is arbitrarily small. Then, player 1 would be allocated the first position and her utility would be be an equilibrium bid vector that induces an assignment σ(b); recall that π j (b) denotes the player that is assigned to position j. Moreover, let o i denote the position given to player i at an optimal allocation, and
Now, consider the following partition of the players:
and by summing over all such players, we
The rest of the proof is dedicated to showing that, for any player i ∈ A and some γ > 0, it holds that
Then, since
, by summing over all players i ∈ A, and by the fact that
Hence, the theorem will follow by combining inequalities (1) and (3), and by choosing γ to be arbitrarily small, since we have that
We now distinguish between cases depending on which mechanism is used. In the following, since the mechanism under consideration is clear from context, we drop it from our notation. 
GSP. For any player i ∈
If the deviating bid does not satisfy the no-over assumption, then we have that
Due to the no-over assumption for player π o i (b), both of these inequalities imply
Since player i has non-negative utility at equilibrium, we conclude that
as desired.
VCG. The proof is similar to that for GSP. The main difference here is that when the deviating bid b πo i (b) + γ of player i ∈ A satisfies the no-over assumption, then player i is again guaranteed to be given position o i , but now has to pay
Observe that, since VCG is a greedy mechanism, at equilibrium we have that
Using this, we can follow the proof template for GSP and show the desired inequality. 
Possible extensions
In this letter, we studied the efficiency of several well-known mechanisms for the allocation of (advertising) positions to strategic budget-constrained users, and proved that their liquid price of anarchy and stability for pure equilibria is exactly 2. Of course, there are multiple interesting open questions that one could attempt to answer here, like exploring all position mechanisms and bounding their liquid price of anarchy and stability.
In particular, is there any position mechanism with liquid price of anarchy strictly smaller than 2, even for the fundamental case of two players?
Another important direction for future research is to consider more general settings, with incomplete information where both the values and the budgets of the players are randomly drawn from some prior distribution, and bound the liquid price of anarchy of position mechanisms for more general equilibrium notions, like coarse-correlated and Bayes-Nash equilibria. Finally, it might be interesting to study scenarios where the budgets of the players are assumed to be common knowledge (or they can be inferred in some way), and design mechanisms with improved social efficiency guarantees, by exploiting this information.
